

HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE DISCIPLINE OF IDENTIFICATION*

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Personal structure and the higher education are the two topics I am to associate in the following text. The issue of interest to me is whether contemporary education, and higher education, in particular, is instrumental to the formation of the person as a flexible structure, fit to participate in the changing contemporary reality.

Higher education can be defined as human person's training for a full value comprehension of him/herself, others and the world. This comprehension is not an unobstructedly mastered rational technique, but something conservative, inherited from the cultural tradition too. And yet, the university, the institutional contemporary media of higher education, originates nowhere else but in Europe. Hence a matter initially to be brought up: i. e. the nature of the conceptualization within the European cultural milieu.

European Type of Comprehension and Semiotics

To the extent it is possible to be synonymously defined, the European type of comprehension is presented as a rational procedure with discrimination and differentiation getting the upper hand over integration. The *semiotics* of our contemporaneity is a particularly extreme expression of this pattern. Though persistent in its sought-for resemblance to a scientific discipline, semiotics follows a definite cultural constant that, seemingly, does not evolve straightforwardly from its project. Provisionally we could refer to it as a discipline of consciously executed discriminations.

Good illustrations are the basic discriminations of Saussure's line of contemplation. The first one is between the outside and the inside of the sign, between the contexts of the signifier and the signified. Further it's is the domain of the sign to be discriminated from the signified by it. On its turn, the signified is to be rationalized as actually existing and ideal object. But the ideal object is not homogeneous either. Though explicated predominantly through culturally "transferred" ideas, in it ideas, produced by the individual interpreter, are implicated too, and what's more, they can also be subjected to quest and discrimination. The semiotic approach relies on the distinction between the signification of actually existing objects (real and ideal) and the projection of feasible but yet non-existing ones.

Exactly this factor transforms semiotics into a peculiar ethics of the scientific language and of the wording as a whole – the stimulated awareness of the possible aspects of an issue under consideration. In so far as talking of something existing almost with no exception presupposes its actuality to be wanted and projected, the awareness, the demarcation of the "shares" of the really existing, wanted and projected in discussing an issue, is an important step towards the ethics of each and every conduct of wording. As to the other step of importance – the discriminations not to be neutralized and the spokesman to reoccur in the situations of non-discrimination, to integrate the already differentiated to a totality of a sort, I'm not sure the semiotic methods incite to it either.

The methods of semiotic approach, according to European scientific norms, are directed predominantly towards discrimination and leave behind the integration of non-scientific fields as art and religion, for example. The point is that in the subjects to be submitted to semiotic

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scrutinization, the signs not only of the discriminated but of the non-discriminated are discernible too. The aspects of the sign expression and content are not entirely differentiable. The outside, the means of signification, always drags behind a signified of a sort; and the inside, the signified, is always under treat to be turned into a sort of a signifier of another signified. On their turn, the signs do not exist by themselves but are transformed and immersed into incessant interaction with other signs.

Hence, two necessities are noticeable here: 1) signs are to be scrutinized in the progress of certain semiosis; 2) after signification of some sort is attained, the signified is to be integrated to the whole from which it was detached with respect to the scrutinization. The signified objects exist in the sense they are engendered by semiosis. In this sense European, but originally human comprehension as a whole, is faced with a difficulty that is not to be overcome by personal awareness and refinement of means of expression applied. No ideal wording or sapient demeanor are available to provide for the two moves – of discrimination and of turning back to the situations of non-discrimination, notwithstanding the great ideas in this respect, such as Plato's dialogue.

In this regard two trends are to be discerned in the field of semiotics too. On one hand, following Saussure's method of approach, the idea the human reality as a setting of discussions, regimes of wordings and conduct is attainable. Consequently, an eventual more flexible comprehension technique would be expressed in a conscious change, coordination and supplementation of more regimes of signification. This type of flexibility, though, degrades to a play of endless selection of view points if the comprehending subject follows the traditional European view of him or herself – as an ideal reticent point of view, set against the object comprehended. Contemporary European intellectuality perpetuates its advance under this denominator.

There is a second semiotic approach to comprehension. It's expressed in the view that the comprehending subject depends on the objects comprehended; besides, the subject is open, changeable and in a process of constant doing. This view is maintained in the Peirce's tradition within which researchers, questioning interpreter's role in semiosis, scrutinize the subject of interpretation in its constant exchange with the cultural milieu.

Contemporary Comprehension of the Personality Structure

If the human reality under the modern living circumstances is to be comprehended as a complex discourse setting and if the comprehending it human personality is in a constant exchange with it, the elaboration of the comprehending human personality, of the "self" structure, follows therefore. Progress of grand scale is to be accomplished if the human reality is comprehended as a denotation of the "self" in a mode of constant adaptation to the changing reality. By saying "changing", I have two things in mind – the actual change of the human milieu, but also the changing knowledge and the image of the world for the individual in particular. This thinking mode presupposes the human "self" to be to a lower degree a specific existence, and to a higher – an existence in its making and becoming.

A making of this kind is as much a personal activity as a social one. Our internal text attends to the making of our "self" relying on models, drawn on the cultural milieu. Thus, in making our own "self" we sustain the "self" norm of the milieu we live in.

This type of relation inconveniences the both sides. The attainment of milieu norms employment of a sort that affords the individual simultaneously to get away with them as an act of warrant of his/her distinctiveness is a problem for the individual in question. To the extent the cultural milieu is liable to this type of scrutinization, it, in turn, depends on the controversial task

of suppressing the “stirs”, generated in the doing of so many “selves”, of keeping its own norms, but, on the other hand, of accepting to a degree these stirs and of applying them to the change of the mentioned norms, that is to say – of itself.

As a type of “self” denotation, the activity of the “self” presupposes variety of discriminations and relation settings. In the move, it is of utmost importance the establishment of the relation settings of “me” and “he” viewpoints. It is brought to subject here the implementation of a transition from the empty subject of “me”, thought of and stuck out, to a bit more completed subject of “he”, related to communities of like-minded that predicate “him” in a certain way and thus fill up that “him” with content. The “he”-sphere is multifarious. I am a human being, a man, of a certain age, a father, a European, a Bulgarian, a lecturer. I can’t correctly count all predicates of mine and correspondingly – the various classes of “he” I am pertaining to. Partly, they are available in all human milieus; partly, they are determined by the modern age. At any case, the contemporary European milieu presupposes participation in “he” of all kinds of description, not only of natural, but of provisional, working and ideal communities too. This is one of the basic manifestations of European contemporaneity.

The semiotic problem is how the multitude of “he” denotes “me” of mine, how the predicates, conveyed by their classes, co-relate in the structure of my “self-ness”, and how the characteristics of the human being, the man and the Bulgarian in me, relate in between. Further on, whether I sense and comprehend them as a natural fact and therefore something always at hand, or I accept in such a way only some of them and the others I treat as temporal and relative? Perhaps I accept non-relatively my affiliation to the class of “human beings” and “men”, while others comprehend in similar way their nationality, and even their sports club membership? But is the first justified by the second? Or perhaps I, by definitely affiliating myself to the class of humans, am insensitive to my belonging to the class of higher mammals as others get their Bulgarian nationality as natural but are insensitive to their affiliation to the wide class of people?

In any case, the collective identity is resulted by the transformation of “me” into “he”, that not only lends content to my “me” but attests to my non-distinction from the others. The view point of “us” is created. This viewpoint is consciously manifested but might be submerged in the unconscious too. As to the sphere of the conscious, the problem is how I construct my identity from the variety of collective identities, whether I construct it invariably from more affiliations or prefer a suspended rigid “me” coinciding with a given collective identity, with definite “us”, apprehended by me as a stable nature and essence. Whether this “us” in me, obtaining its energy from the convergence with “he” - the bearer of certain characteristics, - and with “I” - the characteristic lacking subjectivity, - is a belligerent self-consciousness that conceals and suppresses the rest of my affiliations, or it is open to others “us” in the course of my, changeable, always becoming and now denoted, “me”?

Many people’s proneness easy to lay their head on a given “us” during a conversation is impressive. This is the case when the relation Bulgaria – Europe is under consideration. Our, Bulgarian, comprehended as common and definitely inferior, makes me feel inferior though I am not. On the other hand, the ultra-worthy European, detached from me, turns into “they” and categorically excludes me, though Europe for me is not only “they” but “us” too. It is like that when we get immersed in a certain type of talk or get loose in the negligent inner text of personal or collective depression. Otherwise, in the net of the habitual everyday actions, we are to take hold of a much more supple personal identity and it is unlikely to relapse into the steady variety of “us” revealed in conversation.

So, the first problem of the contemporary “self” activity is the awareness of the different affiliations interwoven in the “self”-structure and the inadmissible option this complexity to be

pushed from the consciousness to the arousing problems unconsciousness, suppressed by some preferable exclusive affiliation. The two extreme types of realizations are as follows: *the integrity of the closed person*, in which the conscious sphere is relegated to the stable role, opposed to the massive unconscious by the non-admittance of other roles to the consciousness; or *the integrity of the open person* which finds expression in a flexible role-assuming, in a constant exchange between conscious and unconscious, and therefore in a guaranteed adaptability to different types of life experience in the changing life circumstances.

Becoming aware to the variety of affiliations that transform themselves into flexible self-structure does not exhaust the personal structuring problem. Contemporary individual has a personal history. Relying mostly on it, he or she acquires “selfness” - a peculiar inner face of distinction and uniqueness provision. But a similar issue arises here too – what type of occurrences comprise this narrative, whether the consciousness interpolates the multifarious real occurrences, connections and transitions in one’s own life or simplifies them to a setting of certain symbols that guarantee the personal integrity only to a stereotype level. Personal stories are always different but in any case they are disposed between the poles of monotony and polyphony, between lifeless stereotype and complex mobile selfness.

In the second case, as it is with the concealed recommendation, mentioned above - the personality to be formed by as many as possible collective affiliations - obviously ideal conditions are brought under consideration but not the real individual who is naturally inclined to get rid of the variety and prefers the common affiliation to a definite “we” and the culturally fixed stereotyped biography. Notwithstanding the gross differences, this aptitude is available to the extent we would refer to it as intrinsic to the human nature.

Human nature, though, is something inconsistent, in a consistent interchange with the human milieu. As to the milieu, and especially to the modern one, it is transformed faster than the physical and the mental form of the man. Thus the imbalance is achieved of the human world being much more complex than the ideas and notions entertained on its behalf by the rank-and-file human being. This condition is corrected to an extent, since being a complex set of discourses and demeanor, contemporary human milieu offers the particular individual tempting modes of use and peculiar personal identifications that, at the same time, impose on the individual in question the practice of a bit more complexly reacting “self” than the traditional culture stereotypes or individual’s own background afford.

The pattern of the unconscious individual and the correcting him human milieu is optimistic but not quite valid. The positive impact is not guaranteed by the rank and file contact of the oversimplifying the reality individuals with the complex human world. The complication might hasten up, as the case with the contemporary Europe is, might become hostile and alien to the man. Its reception depends on the exchange between the changing human milieu and the ever more flexible human personality.

At the same time, let’s not forget that really existing are the individuals, not the principle of the person. The human milieu becomes intricate precisely to guarantee the variety of independent drives accessible to ever increasing number of individuals. To be employed and developed, and not turned into duty, this ever complicated human milieu presupposes not only the intrinsic complexity of the self-structure, the growth of the scope of the conscious in it but the realization of all these for ever growing number of individuals too. Perhaps there is nothing more intricate in the contemporary world than the process of the increasing number of individuals with flexible self-structure.

The question is to what extent this is self-realized, to what extent it is socially manageable and to what – dependable on the every single person’s endeavor.

At first glance the democratic society existence stimulates the ever occurring and in a process of making “self” of a great number of individuals; besides, it facilitates the exteriorization of the bias that human reality is not only something given but dependable on personal will too. Namely in circumstances like these - of mobility and freedom guaranteed, - the modern individual can't be forced to prefer flexible to stable personal identity. Individual's freedom finds expression also in the chance of a detached and apart existence, and among other things, in a sort of a past, sustained unchanged. Contemporary European milieu manifests itself in a variety of options of choice and demeanor, for found in a different position, individuals do not depend entirely on the enticement of the milieu with growing complexity and are not liable to effective management by social projects disregarding their freedom. In this sense, in the contemporary life context, the attainment of the identification mechanism of flexible signification of the “self” is a problem of the social organization to the extent it is a problem of a conscious direction of the genuine “self” activity too.

Forms of Education

If person's identification is a complex of habits, emotional reactions and individual's ability to adjust to the world, it is obvious, that forms of education are not without bearing on this complex. The school and the university are human milieu models. Therefore, it is natural the immersed in the milieu of this type resident to acquire certain habits of attachment to and detachment in the “self”, and hence of its making.

Contemporaneity, because of its principle diversity and openness to the past, keeps the traditional education massif, and with it – the traditional comprehension of the relation between the individual and the milieu. By traditional education I have in mind mostly the steadily fixed form of the elementary and the secondary school, which still seems lively to me, especially here, in Bulgaria. The communication in this milieu follows the power model and the hierarchical order of the family. The school class is a proper example in this sense. In its closed space, the teacher, the bearer of the knowledge, is juxtaposed to the mass of the students set up by his or her rating in a sort of hierarchy. The estimation always occurs from outside and the estimated ones compete for their hierarchical upswing. To the utmost it all depends on the teacher. In the best case the teacher guards the weak and sustains the parity of the students' community. In any case, the model of the closed family milieu is followed. Genuine parity is attainable only through the festive playful chaos of the order and hierarchy turned upside down.

The fact the traditional school follows the model of the family, and therefore of the closed society, shouldn't be rendered in negative light. At the outset at least the growing up need the form of the competition for the maternal warmth and paternal authority. The issue is whether the principles of this communication are to be set under question and thus transformed into principles of another type or we stay fixed upon them. For varieties of this world-model – the family, the school or the barracks - are susceptible to idealization and turn into agents of regression to the childhood.

The educational philosophy of the traditional school is instrumental in this aim in so far as it pursues more of the intellectual than the social formation of the growing up. The social is understood mostly as skills setting to manage the existing milieu. The knowledge acquired at school maintains not that much this view than provides with rational arguments in favour of the passive acceptance of the world as an order and a subject docile to be memorized. Atomization is the customary consequence of this type of education. Deprived of social skills, the young people cultivate overactive or overpassive attitude towards life. According their natural inclinations they are separated into resorted to violence leaders and sufferers of subjection, into individuals with

predominantly hypomaniacal or depressive inclination. Both, though, are equally prone to shift to reality or others their intrinsic problems.

Because of the higher degree of choice and conscious participation, as well as because of its more complicated organization, the higher education is expected to play a prominent part in the structuring of the flexible identity under discussion. By higher education I have in mind the curriculum, the system and the forms of education, but also the rest of communication forms within the university campus that often put a permanent mark on student's personality. Notwithstanding the extent of their variegation, the contemporary forms of higher education and the university organization are set between the two poles of the state-dependent "secondary-school" university and the state-independent marginal higher education school.

Though some of the university forms are set in the Middle Ages, institutionalized state university is formed comparatively late – under the conditions of contemporary national state. Its model is explicated in the German university of humanities – embodiment of the ideals of the great minds from the beginning of the 19th century. This type of university turns into durable imitation pattern because of its attainments in the field of humanities, philology, philosophy and history, but because of mindfulness of student's individuality too. Its immediate task is to train senior governmental officials and the wider one – the intellectual elite of the nation.

The élite of this type is a conservative element, guardian of the durable and the out of time. Hence the demand the élite educated one to operate with highly abstract principles or at least to have the use of the mental technique to attain the root of the matter in hand. The main point to be comprehended as a ground obligation, mechanically implies the educated one to be subjected to the datum of the world. The knowledge and the personality are the two sides of the coin.

The knowledge is directed to the durable order of things and the personality is comprehended as an ideal selfness, juxtaposed to the world and therefore wavering between the poles of ecstasy and bitterness. I do not detect significant differentiation in the setting of the school and of the university; hence my reason to classify the latter one as a "secondary-school".

It is intriguing that the secondary-school elements are intensified in another form of higher education, developed later, during 19th century in Germany too – the German polytechnic. Established with an eye on the sciences, free of the abstract model of spirituality and directed to the immediate and topical, this type of schooling leaves off the democratic forms of communication that practically compensate the abstract vital setting of the German university of humanities. Polytechnic is closely and hierarchically organized. Namely it is borrowed by the Soviet system of higher education whose environment additionally enforces its closed pattern. Appropriated in Bulgaria after World War II, the secondary Soviet education attacks the abstract spirituality acquired by the Sofia University at its establishment at the end of 19th century after the pattern of the German university of humanities. At the encounter with the cast of the Soviet school and because of the lingering semblance with the German university of humanities, the secondary-school manner in the general orientation of the Bulgarian state university acquires exclusive resistance.

This type of orientation has its particular manifestation – in the curriculum and student's admittance, in the closed in themselves departments and chairs whose unrealistic order is compensated by the inside chaos and ineffectiveness in the initiatives implementation. The pattern of the monotonous lecture-hall classes' communication with the passive audience and the cathedra-pulpit is a manifestation of this form. The rule is the auditory to be the mass, not an organized group, for the knowledge is given but not occurring during the education process. The lecturer, as well, depends on outward to the lecture-hall circumstances. This order presupposes

student's detachment in the relation with the lecturers as well as the lecturer's subjection to the strict order of promotion. Because of its inertness, the university education loses touch with the changing reality. The same, on its turn, occurs with the science, hence the necessity it to be set apart from the education and shut up in research institutions.

This type of the Bulgarian state university orientation is a mark of a philosophy of certain notions of order and conduct, of knowledge and world. The order is first and foremost a hierarchical orientation and the knowledge – comprehension and reception of objectivities. Therefore, the prevalence of the view that the managing the human milieu nuclei skills exhaust the social demeanor. To the extent the world is changing or something new is ascertained, it is comprehended as downfall of the settled order or it is established as a rule in schizoid contradiction with that order. As the control over the reality indicates insight into the existing classifications – diachronically or synchronically explicated, - so the science, the settled compound of knowledge, presumes each and everyone's ingress into some of its corridors and his or her identification with it. University of this type sustains in its organization and philosophy the notion of the human milieu as a nomenclature and hierarchy which protects the government officials.

With its plain hierarchical order and principal detachment in the developing reality, the secondary-school state university, as an educational center, is constantly exposed to the realization tendency of the closed society values. They hardly would have gained ground if they had not been in unison with the traditional structuring of the "self", held up in an institution of this type. The function of the secondary-school university is nothing more but a queer loading of the empty "self" of the ones under training referring them to the predicates of the explicit classes. These are predominantly the nomenclature stable disciplines and evolving from them professions and categories, placed in a vertical order. Built on the distinct affiliations, student's identity is charged with respect for the nomenclature and in the event – for the order maintained. Both the particular student and the university hardly presume the dispersed, changeable and abstracted, complicated vision of themselves and of the world affiliations.

This pattern is far-fetched. The higher education is brought to subject, not the universities in reality. The pattern is far-fetched because similar subjects are hardly to be discussed in their pure form. The one, taking the question under consideration, has a position of his own. I make use of this consideration to convince myself and the others in the ineffectiveness of the Bulgarian state university. The reality and the wish are inevitably interwoven. The immediate goal herewith is the wanted to be discriminated to a certain degree from the really existing, and even better – brought to a project.

As it comes to *the liberal in form higher educational institution*, we, it seems to me, are to look for its roots in the corporate structure of the Mediaeval university. In constant struggle with a outward power and inward opposition of organized groups without distinct borders, marginal and of a well-balanced might, these universities have cultivated a multifarious, vacillating in its subjects knowledge and are, in themselves, an unstable set of living milieus along with the variety of groups and worldviews. The aim has been indistinct - students read for the practice of the basic Mediaeval professions but had the pleasure of the communication, presently within the university campus, with a marginal society which in the "masquerade" of the mobile university corporeality tried the hierarchy of the Mediaeval social order. The paradox is that such was the character of the universities under the jurisdiction of the clergy. The universities, subordinated to the secular authorities were easily to be closed down, to be subjected to the hierarchization and uniformed simplification of the order.

The liberal worldly attitude of the Mediaeval universities seems to have one and only integral extension – the English college of the type of Oxford and Cambridge. This model of university communication was spread through the United States. There, of course, it does not remain in pure form. Contemporary American universities are diffusion of a different degree of secondary-school and liberal organization. Yet, in general, the liberal pattern prevails in the American higher educational institutions.

Under the influence of the typical of the American life democratic match of various communities' interests, the American universities assumed the form of a thought over complex nets with various aims and goals. This system of inclusive milieus, of compound subordination and at the same time of freedom of choice, finds its outward expression too – in the contacts of the universities with the society, in the complex interwoven relations of self-financing and control by the state, district and private institutions. On this ground necessity of the reality inquire is promoted for the purpose of funding provision, graduated students' employment and the flow of new applicants bail. The system of subordination and commitment of interests eliminates the option students to be disinterested by the cost of their education, and through it – by its quality.

All this brings to curriculum and educational methods mobility. American university is in a position to create new professions and to participate in the development of the society as a whole. Outwardly open and inwardly flexible, it is concerned for the harmonization of the order and the change functions. The order is available, though not connected with uniformity, rules simplification and slackening security. The quality is guaranteed by the hierarchy too. The access to the ten best American universities is not easy but this in itself does not prevent the existence of hundreds other high educational schools. The vertical knowledge of things is constantly complemented by the horizontal one. Hence - the complex, variegated structure. Supremacy is available, but also democratic discrimination between the financial authority, the administrative one and the one supervising educative and scientific affairs.

The American university carries on the Mediaeval university corporeality as a site of team life in milieus set. The particular student or lecturer knows and enjoys his or her privileges but relies on a community too. In the complex net of personal and communal interests the student is socially educated and learns to join in the subjects of various collective bodies. There are, of course, emotions, extremes and failures. But if a sort of mythology and unreflexive symbols are available, the collective affiliations and the options of communication are exuberant to an extent no university community develops the imperative of the total affiliation. The university sociality remains variable and gaming.

The rational spirit deprived of a total ideology is sustained because of the provided by the university order activity rights. The student pays, chooses courses and lecturers, to a high degree works out his own program or partially changes its direction; he or she can suspend his or her education, can continue in a different educational institution, can score credits not only through study but through other activities too; can participate in research projects. As a whole, the student is not set apart from the lecturer and has no experience with the communicational conventions of the traditional secondary-school institutions. As the open doors of the lecture-halls in the American universities do not prevent going in and out during the classes, so it is permissible the lecturer's speech to be cut off. University discourse stays close to the colloquial.

The life attitude of this university type, naturally relegated to formulae, is only a generalization; therefore, it is something wanted. Probably the secondary-school reticence is at hand in many American universities, particularly in the professional colleges. And perhaps there are places where the described by me spirit is a convention deprived of content – just like the normative American cheerfulness that often conceals the tension and incommunicativeness of the

Americans in particular. Yet, the liberal communication in the American universities is explicated in concrete acts, not detached in the general positive predisposition of the university activity participants. To considerable extent this fact is due to the institutional philosophy of the American universities that upholds the notions of world and of human person where on one hand the ideas of objectivity and change are balanced, and on the other - of dependence and freedom.

This university philosophy suggests that regardless its conventionality, hierarchy of this type is necessary; also, that the parity is natural but it's a stand that has to be sustained. Following this philosophy, the university structuring, on its turn, places in operative link the comprehension that the variegated human milieu depends on the human activity and to be adjusted to it, the individual is to be with a flexible identity. Simultaneously the milieu changes and develops, for the human personality is unsteady and mobile. American university seems to endorse that it is a pleasure to participate in the world's set of chances only if the participant sustains and makes the wealth of his or her own personality. On this ground the developed in the modern time information net has its ideal projection in the world model presupposing a multitude of free changeable individuals open to the changing multifarious milieu.

Whatever the collective view points might be, the individual interests and options are not to be slipped by the system of that sort of world structuring. Hence its realistic, pragmatic but vital predisposition too. The life – the rhythm between the contact with the other and the detachment in the familiar, - is comprehended as fluctuation between staying changeless and the pleasure of inclusion. The subject has at his or her disposal the change inside, but outside too; besides he or she is not deprived by the traditional chance to preserve himself or herself the same and to find enjoyment in the identity of the stable habits. This setting does not prevent the recluse who insists on the independent management of the relations with the world but presupposes the delight of going beyond himself or herself in a set that creates options of bidding and status changes.

The positive tinge in the said on the institutional philosophy of the American university is nourished by my wish our university to be changed. Out of question, I give up to a utopian discourse. But it is utopian not only because of the wish for renovation. Each institutional philosophy is utopian in relation to the inflexible reality. Just as the form of the American society and its ideology are utopian in relation to the American reality. The matter at hand is the relation between the utopia of the form and the slipping off reality. It might find an expression in commonplace lack of coordination. But relegated to projects, the utopia might participate in the reality-making.

Undoubtedly the lack of coordination between the institutional philosophy utopia and the tangibility of the American university daily round is weaker than between the life form and the life itself in the American society. In this sense, as it comes to the society, the universities are a sort of realized utopia for their projects are facile in contrast to the grand human milieu projects. American universities are nuclei in the experimental reduction of the mental utopia to the rational form and reality.

The mindfulness of the complicated relation of collective and individual interests' rationalization, imposed by the life circumstances in the contemporary world, is among the numerous conscious and unconscious tasks in this experiment. It is a compound-complex task. One of questions at hand is how the more and more variegated and mobile human milieu and the multifarious mobile and changeable human communities are to be co-related. In this co-relation the particular human being is not just an important point of intersection. The co-relation occurs for it and because of it. The world is complex and it's impossible to be otherwise for the human

being is complex in itself. The matter in hand is to what extent this complexity exists and has to be specified, and to what – it is something subjected to cultivation.

The model, developed in the institutional philosophy of the American university, is of flexible human personality cultivation and by itself does not guarantee its own successful realization exactly in the American universities but not anywhere else. Just like a guarantee is lacking that the cast in the Western Europe ideals can't find a better realization away from the European centers. The conveyable human experience can be among the expressions of freedom of most common use if the prejudice that we are strictly attached to a particular human milieu is not standing in our way as before.**

** On the relation of “I” and “self”, see Mead, G.H. (1967[1934]) *Mind, Self, and Society*, transl. from English, Pleven, 1997; and Ricoeur, P. *Soi-même comme un autre*, 1990, P. On identity, see Erikson, E. (1968) *Identity: Youth and Crisis*, transl. from English, Sofia 1996. On the discrimination between the collective and individual identity, see: Βεϊκός Εθνικισμός και εθνική ταυτότητα. Αθήνα, 1993. The terms “flexible identity” and “integrity of an open type” are synonyms of the term “modular individual”, see Gellner, E. (1995) *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals*, transl. from English, Sofia, 1996.