

From the staticity of the word to the dynamicity of the phrase

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1. I am reformulating the announced topic. I shall speak about the transition from a verbal expression towards a meaning and a denoted thing. I am making this change because both the word and the phrase are reducible to the more general notion of *verbal expression* and the transition between them depends on the more general transition of the verbal expression towards what it designates and what it denotes.
2. This transition does not interest me on a paradigmatic level but on a syntagmatic and pragmatic level. That is, I propound the verbal expression as prepared for use as well as already in use. Hence I do not consider the transition from a verbal expression (word, phrase, text) to a meaning and a denoted thing, but rather the transition from one designating to another and, respectively, from one denoting to another.
3. I use this formula for expressing what could also be said in a more terminological way, viz that the veracity of every saying is a result of an intertwining of signification and reference. Of course different logics and semantics are not unanimous about this matter. Veracity or truthfulness is more often understood as a relation of reference than an intertwining of reference and signification.
4. And the third possible component is discussed even more rarely – meaningful intervention on the level of *use*. Although many logicians, semanticians and semioticians distinguish between so-called propositional meanings of verbal expressions and the sense resulting from their understanding and use, the answer concerning the components of veracity is impeded by a hesitation about whether meaning and sense are separable and whether the former points to the latter or rather vice versa.
5. In addition, another hesitation intervenes – whether the so-called “use” is only expressed in the communication of interpreters related to the transmitted assertion, or whether it also includes the result of the interpreters’ readjustment which, by intending a possible world, also concerns some absentees from this communicative act? That is, use could be reduced to the act of understanding of the

communicators, but it could also be conceived more generally as an act of a kind of becoming and doing.

6. But there are also controversies at this point – namely, whether the two acts succeed each other or whether the understanding is already a kind of becoming and doing. I adhere to the second view, for I think that the act of signifying-denotating in the verbal expression is not only an asserting and, respectively, understanding, but also a doing.
7. Here is a possible “working” formula, based on that view: every saying of something is asserting that this thing is such and that it belongs to a class of such things, but it also posits an existing class of “understanders” such as the speaker, who share a common possible world.
8. “Existing” means both real and modal existence, in the sense that both the discussed thing with its class and the class of “understanders” and their world not only exist but also make and remake themselves in the course of saying with regard to some “can” or “should”. Hence the view that by saying whatever veracity of the said depends not only on the relation between the verbal expression, meaning and the denoted thing, but also on the situation of understanding.
9. The third pragmatic component in a way specifies - and thereby limits - the possible polysemy of the denoted thing in a verbal expression. At the same time such a specification does not go beyond the limit of the maintained minimal ambiguity. Whatever is specified in the pragmatic situation of an asserting something is always combined with at least one more assertion.
10. Why so? Because the presupposed possible world of the assertion should, so as to be a world, consist of at least two meanings and two related things. It has to be minimally variational or ready for another understanding with another class of “understanders”. Hence the efficacy of polysemy and change in every designative act.
11. The main impulse for change in and through any saying is the basic semantic hesitation about whether the represented meaning and the designated thing *are* such, or whether they *could* and *should* be such. Polysemy and change are semantically determined in the semiotic interrelation of “is” assertions with “could” and “should” assertions. The pragmatic reason for this situation is that for some people a thing is such and for others it is different, but it should be something for everyone understanding it at that moment.

12. The discussed formula about what happens during the saying of something could be expressed in many ways. Its pragmatic direction could be strengthened or weakened. However, as far as possible, it should be presented in use. In real utterances the pragmatic, semantic and syntagmatic aspects are intertwined. That's why it's better to complete and correct pragmatically oriented formulations with variations emphasizing semantics and syntagmatics.
13. The semantic account should be directed towards the clustering polysemy and the accumulation of meanings in single verbal units. In usage they are composed by a number of meanings which is sometimes higher and sometimes lower. But what is most important is that use transforms them into semiotic units, in a kind of revolving globe of meanings. This very revolving is the semiotic expression of semantic polysemy.
14. The semiotic redundancy of meaning in the use of verbal units is a problem for scientific discourse as well as everyday speech. Speaking disposes the means of restricting this redundancy. One of these means is an extreme one – the so-called *reification* – the transformation of words into things. It is extreme because, in a way, it interrupts speaking.
15. Although reification etymologically means “reducing to something”, this reducing is expressed by attaching a given meaning to a word, which stabilizes its sense. In scientific discourse that is the function of terms developed on a Latin base – they guarantee a more exact meaning because it is more difficult for them to intertwine with other words and in this sense they are less exposed to redundancy.
16. But natural speaking also reifies. It also counters the confusing level of signification with excessive referring. When there is something to be pointed to, it is pointed to. When there is no such thing, the very words are entified or, more precisely, their intensionals are thought objectively.
17. This is how the opposite danger arises, from which speech escapes – the excessive univocity of verbal units, the excessive distinctness and separateness of words and things. Because if the number of distinct things is exactly determined and a language corresponds to them with precisely matching verbal units, this world of things will not be a human world, nor will the language be a human language.

18. The human world designates the things in it to be now this way and now that. Respectively, the language consisting of verbal units which designates now this way and now that, is also human, as well as speech which not only refers to, but produces meanings and, through them, produces things. To put it another way – the non-correspondence of verbal units, meanings and designated things, is human.
19. Hence the syntagmatic level of saying, which permits the reified said thing to be said in a non-reified way, stressing through sequence of synonyms and synonymic assertions that the meaning is not just this, but rather a sequence of meanings constituting the particular configuration of the intensional, which corresponds neither to the verbal expression nor to the designated thing.
20. There is also another option – the thing named by means of this verbal expression and denoted by means of this intensional can also be named by means of another verbal expression and thus enter into a new signification, in which the intensional and the thing itself could both be changed.
21. At this point the argument could stop and we could say that this is the triple pragmatic-semantic-syntagmatic working model, which represents what is done and what happens when something is said. Of course the model is very reductive because saying in general, here restricted to asserting, is only a presupposed frame for the many and more concretely existing forms of saying something.
22. But in the presented model there is an important concealed side, namely that every saying is supported by the form of something already said and uses a paradigm for understanding. In this sense, saying is always something already understood, by the one who understands. To put it another way, we do not presuppose that every saying is speaking or that it is posited in some kind of understanding and expressed as a terminological network as well as an implicitly given possible world.
23. So, sayings are determined by different speakings. The speakings are many. Maybe the most valid assertion on this question is that no speaking is the best one. A better speaking is achieved by substituting and complementing one speaking with another. This works because the speakings are different, but also because they are not confined in

themselves - which enables professional speaking about speaking in general.

24. Based on this view, I incidentally adopted the broad opposition between everyday and scientific speech and showed their related practice of reification. Hence the suggestion that the difference between them is not as big as it seems and that everyday speaking has advantages which are usable by scientific speaking.
25. A similar relation holds between scientific and semiotic speaking. On one hand there are many kinds of scientific and semiotic speaking, on the other hand we can speak about them in the singular. We could claim that scientific speech is more reductive than semiotic speech, hence semiotic speaking is a better scientific speaking.
26. Why? Because semiotic discourse has other and subtler distinctions at its disposal, as well as the basic distinction between verbal expression, meaning and designated thing. Which means that semiotic discourse has a tool for overcoming excessive reification and acts as safeguard against lapses into the labyrinth of pure signification.
27. Yet, as any scientific discourse, semiotic speaking also has many occurrences and species. On the other hand the fact that it has this instrument for distinction does not warrant its use. That's why speaking about a semiotic subject can occur in a non-semiotic way, the use of semiotic terms can be just external and, conversely, speaking with non-semiotic terms can be semiotic.
28. But is it possible to speak semiotically evenly and continuously? Rather not. Because no real speaking could strictly follow a single paradigm. Real speakings combine paradigms and therefore they are uneven. They are such because they assert more than one thing and because they are not only asserting, but also making something, produce meaning. For that it is risky to prescribe the qualities of the good semiotic discourse.
29. I am doing something else. I am directing the attention towards the discussed "working" formula and as a sign of good speaking I point out not only the distinctions that the formula introduces, but also the possible moments of indistinction and merging. My realistic attitude makes me believe that, like any speaking, the semiotic one also presupposes phases in which the verbal expression does not match its intentional and the designated thing, but also phases, in which functional indistinction is developed.

30. What we could recommended is for the speaking semiotician to be aware of that, as far as possible. Namely in view of this, that, as any other speaking, the semiotic one is also uneven and multi-paradigmatic, it is particularly important to pay attention to the natural variances in the semiotic paradigm.
31. Good examples of the acceptance of the variances are not very many. One, in my view, is the scientific writing of Peirce, who is constructing distinct paradigms with the view of the use and the treatment of the complex transformation of one kind of signs to another. The other example is Eco, who is not using univocal terms within a simple paradigm, but, navigating among various paradigms, is able to find a common ground for the univocity of terms such as signified, meaning, intensional or percept.
32. I rely on these two authorities but I also insist on differing from them. I do this with two basic expansions. The first one is that the pragmatic situation is also a situation of doing and the semiotic paradigm is a prescribed way of understanding, as well as a prescribed possible world. The second is that uneven speaking at times distinguishes between verbal expression, the signified (as a notion, meaning or a compound of meanings) and the denoted thing and at times does not distinguish between them, confusing the expression with meaning, or even with the denoted thing.
33. Hence the continuous doing of things in the course of any speech – of word-things, constituted in the construction in the intensional elaborated here and there; or of words-representations, carried by language. When speaking, we point to the intensionals of non-ostensible things as if they were ostensible. And we do not just point to them but remake them or make them anew.
34. I have in mind Eco's effort to get into what he calls the black box and to outline the mechanism of making the intensional - that intermediate entity between the percept, the notion and the schema. Hence the collaboration between semiotics and a kind of cognitive science which is also looking for that entity.
35. Here I also have in mind something else – the raised barrier between interpretant and object in Peirce, and the related idea of *dynamic object*, as well as the demonstration of how, at a given moment of semiosis, the linguistic symbol is transformed into an index and heads towards the denoted object.

36. This gives me a reason for adding the following pragmatic supplement: the mental sign – the intensional – is also a schema, a kind of model for a thing of experience, but also a model for things which could be conceived. That is why a semiotics of the image has to deal with this presupposed schematic intensional, both in an individual mind, and in the complex cultural paradigm which always occurs in it.
37. This entails a second possible supplement: where else could we grasp the schematicity of an internal image if not from the external figurativeness of the world? Similarly, how could we grasp what is schematically denoted in the act of saying a non- ostensible thing if not by having access to visible things in the human world?
38. What are they, if not already realized schema-intensionals? Aren't these the rectangular rooms we are living in, as well as so many other things? Aren't they intensionals, transformed into extensionals which produce other extensionals through variation, according to the model of producing intensionals in the speech or the internal discourse of thought and representation?
39. That entails the possibility of comparing the processes in the human (social) environment with speech, as well as the conviction that semiotic discourse should become more efficient if it were not trying to overcome reification in scientific and natural speaking. Rather, semiotic discourse instrumentalizes scientific and natural discourse, or at least recognizes that in the act of any speaking we not only understand, but are also doing something.
40. So, in any saying and thus also in mine, various topics were mixed together. I renounced the topic formulated in the title for another one, but in this presentation I also touched on a third one. For, in order to be effective, a saying should deal with its topic as an open value which crosses over to other topics related to it and it is natural for this crossing of topics to also occur on the level of the text, as well as on the level of a particular expression.